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Abstract
We analyze undiscounted continuous-time games of strategic experimentation
with two-armed bandits. The risky arm generates payoffs according to a Le´vy
process with an unknown average payoff per unit of time which nature draws from
an arbitrary finite set. Observing all actions and realized payoffs, players use Markov
strategies with the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the
state variable. We show that the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium can
be computed in a simple closed form involving only the payoff of the safe arm, the
expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the expected full-information payoff,
given the current belief. In particular, the equilibrium does not depend on the
precise specification of the payoff-generating processes.
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1 Introduction
We analyze a class of continuous-time two-armed bandit models in which a number of
players act non-cooperatively, trying to learn an unknown state of the world that gov-
erns the risky arm’s expected payoff per unit of time. Actual payoffs are given by Le´vy
processes, that is, processes with independent and stationary increments. In addition,
players receive free background information in the form of a process of the same type
as the payoff processes. Rather than discounting future payoffs, players evaluate their
payoff streams according to the strong long-run average criterion.1 Assuming that all
actions and payoffs are public information, we restrict players to Markov strategies with
the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the natural state variable,
and we look for Markov perfect equilibria.
This setting allows us to handle a much larger class of priors and payoff-generating
processes than the existing literature on bandit-based multi-agent learning in continuous
time. First, the unknown state of the world can be drawn from an arbitrary finite set,
whereas the literature assumes a binary state. Second, the payoff processes can combine
continuous with discrete increments, whereas the literature assumes either Brownian or
Poisson payoffs. Third, lump-sum payoffs can be good or bad news, whereas the literature
assumes that news is of one type only.
The broadening of the class of payoff-generating processes, and the generalization from
Bernoulli to arbitrary discrete priors in particular, is not entirely without costs, however.
In the Brownian model of Bolton and Harris (1999, 2000) and the Poisson models of
Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010, 2015), beliefs evolve on the
unit interval, which allows for a space of admissible Markov strategies large enough to
accommodate the discontinuities of actions with respect to beliefs which are an immutable
feature of asymmetric equilibria. For these settings, the results of Bolton and Harris (2000)
yield a characterization of the entire set of undiscounted Markov perfect equilibria. In
general, however, one must invoke results on the existence and uniqueness of solutions
to stochastic differential equations that rely on Lipschitz continuity of coefficients. This
rules out asymmetric equilibria but, as our main result shows, the space of Lipschitz
continuous strategies is large enough to ensure existence of a unique symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium.
The equilibrium strategy has a simple explicit form, moreover. As already noted
in Bolton and Harris (2000), the absence of discounting and the presence of background
1 This criterion is the limit of the standard discounted performance criterion as the discount rate goes
to zero, both in terms of value functions and optimal strategies. See Dutta (1991) for the connection
between performance criteria with and without discounting in discrete time, and Bolton and Harris (2000)
for a detailed treatment of the strong long-run average criterion in a continuous-time Bayesian-learning
setting such as ours.
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information imply that a player’s best response can be computed without knowledge of the
player’s value function. In fact, given the current belief, a player’s optimal action depends
only on the intensity of experimentation performed by the other players, the payoff of the
safe arm, the expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the expected full-information
payoff – it does not depend on the precise specification of the payoff-generating process.
This feature carries over to the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, where one and
the same functional form – the natural generalization of that in Bolton and Harris (2000)
– applies across all specifications that we consider. The common equilibrium action is
a piecewise linear function of the ratio of two differences: that between the risky arm’s
expected full-information payoff and the safe payoff, and that between the safe payoff and
the risky arm’s expected current payoff.
We show that this result extends to two specifications of priors and payoff-generating
processes in which the unknown state of the world is drawn from a continuous distribution
of unbounded support: Brownian payoffs with normal priors as in Jovanovic (1979),
and Poisson payoffs with gamma priors as in Moscarini and Squintani (2010). In either
specification, the players’ information is captured by a two-dimensional sufficient statistic,
which can serve as the state variable for Markov strategies.
Our result hinges on four features of the setting that we study: (i) players receive
free background information; (ii) they use the strong long-run average criterion; (iii) the
experimentation game is played in continuous time; and (iv) the players’ risky payoff
processes and the background information are all of the same (unknown) type, hence
perfect substitutes with respect to learning. The background information ensures that
players learn the true state eventually, no matter what strategy profile they use. This
makes it possible to evaluate players’ random payoff streams according to the strong
long-run average criterion, that is, by computing the expected accumulated shortfall of
received payoffs relative to the expected full-information payoff. Under this criterion, the
problem of finding a best response to the opponents’ Markovian strategy profile has a
recursive structure amenable to dynamic-programming techniques. In continuous time,
this leads to an HJB equation in which the value function enters only through the expected
rate of change of continuation payoffs. When the players’ risky payoff processes and the
background information are all of the same type, moreover, the rate of change of expected
continuation values is linear in the total intensity of experimentation. This makes it
possible to eliminate a player’s value function completely from the maximization problem
in the HJB equation, so best responses can be determined without reference to the value
function and the payoff-generating processes.
Each of these four features is indeed crucial. Without background information, the
strong long-run average criterion would be ill-defined because the expected accumulated
shortfall of received payoffs relative to the expected full-information payoff would always
grow infinitely large. With discounting, the HJB equation would necessarily contain a
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term ‘discount rate times current value’ that is not multiplied by the total intensity of
experimentation, so best responses would depend on current values. As pointed out in
Dutta (1991), moreover, alternative undiscounted performance criteria would not permit a
recursive representation. If the model were set in discrete time, the expected rate of change
of continuation payoffs would not be linear in the total intensity of experimentation. In a
discrete-time version of an exponential bandit game a` la Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005),
for example, the probability of a success in any given round is clearly non-linear in the
number of players pulling the risky arm. Linearity would also fail if the type of the risky
arm were independent or imperfectly correlated across players, or if the law of the payoff
process differed across players.2
While the computation of best responses does not involve the specifics of the payoff-
generating processes, the evolution of the players’ posterior beliefs obviously does depend
on how the payoffs are generated, as do the players’ equilibrium payoffs. To characterize
the latter, and to verify that a certain profile of Markov strategies constitutes an equilib-
rium, one has to solve a functional equation that involves the infinitesimal generator of the
belief process. Our approach here is to show that the player’s value function is the unique
viscosity solution of the HJB equation subject to the relevant boundary conditions, and
that the payoff function for the suggested strategy profile also solves this boundary-value
problem, so the two must agree and the player indeed plays a best response.3
Besides Bolton and Harris (2000), the undiscounted limit of a continuous-time stochas-
tic game with one-dimensional state space has also been studied in Harris (1988, 1993)
and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1997, 2002), yielding a much simpler characterization
of equilibria than under discounting. More recent applications of this methodology to
single-agent experimentation problems can be found in Bonatti (2011) and Peitz, Rady
and Trepper (2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the game and states
our assumptions on priors, payoff-generating processes and strategy spaces. Section 3
presents the infinitesimal generator of the process of posterior beliefs. Section 4 constructs
the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. Section 5 presents extensions of our
analysis to two settings with a continuously distributed state of world. Section 6 offers
some concluding remarks.
2 Linearity would also fail in a restless bandit model in which the state of the world changed exoge-
nously over time. This would be the case, for example, if payoffs were generated by a Brownian motion
with an unknown drift subject to Markovian state-switching between a high and a low level as in Keller
and Rady (1999, 2003).
3 For a recent application of this approach to the verification of optimality in a single-agent learning
context with Brownian signals, see Ke and Villas-Boas (2019).
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2 The Experimentation Game
Time t ∈ [0,∞[ is continuous. There are N ≥ 1 players, each of them endowed with
one unit of a perfectly divisible resource per unit of time. Each player faces a two-armed
bandit problem where she continually has to decide what fraction of the available resource
to allocate to each arm. One arm is safe, the other risky.
The safe arm generates a known constant payoff s > 0 per unit of time. The evolution
of the payoffs generated by the risky arm depends on a state of the world, ℓ, which
nature draws from the set {0, 1, . . . , L} with L ≥ 1 according to the positive probabilities
π0, . . . , πL. Players do not observe the state, but know its distribution. They also know
that the payoff process associated with player n’s risky arm is of the form
Xnt = ρ t+ σZ
n
t + Y
n
t ,
where Zn is a standard Wiener process and Y n is a compound Poisson process whose
Le´vy measure ν is finite and has a finite second moment
∫
h2 ν(dh).4 The drift rate ρ, the
diffusion coefficient σ > 0 and the Le´vy measure ν are the same for all players. While σ is
the same in all states of the world, moreover, ρ and ν vary with the state.5 Conditionally
on ℓ, the processes Z1, . . . , ZN , Y 1, . . . , Y N are independent.
We write ρℓ and νℓ for the drift rate and Le´vy measure in state ℓ, λℓ = νℓ(R\{0}) for the
expected number of jumps per unit of time, and hℓ =
∫
R\{0}
h νℓ(dh) / λℓ for the expected
jump size. The state-contingent expected risky payoff per unit of time is µℓ = ρℓ + λℓ hℓ.
We assume that µ0 < µ1 < . . . < µL−1 < µL with µ0 < s < µL, so that neither arm
dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs. Writing π for the vector of probabilities
(π1, . . . , πL), we let m(π) denote the expected current (or myopic) payoff from the risky
arm, and f(π) a player’s expected full-information payoff:6
m(π) =
L∑
0
πℓµℓ, f(π) =
L∑
0
πℓmax{s, µℓ}.
Let kn,t ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the available resource that player n allocates to
the risky arm at time t; this fraction is required to be measurable with respect to the
information that the player possesses at time t. The player’s cumulative payoff up to
4 Here, ν(B) < ∞ is the expected number of jumps per unit of time whose size is in the Borel set
B ⊆ R\{0}. The finite second moment ensures that the processesXn have finite mean and finite quadratic
variation.
5 Our assumptions on the diffusion coefficient and the Le´vy measures ensure that the players cannot
infer the true state instantaneously from the continuous and jump part of risky payoffs, respectively.
6 Given our convention to treat π1, . . . , πL as the independent variables, π0 should be viewed as
shorthand for 1−
∑
L
ℓ=1
πℓ from now on.
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time T is then given by the time-changed process [T − τn(T )] s +Xnτn(T ) where τ
n(T ) =∫ T
0
kn,t dt measures the operational time that the risky arm has been used. As X
n
t − µt is
a martingale, the player’s expected payoff up to T is
E
[∫ T
0
{(1− kn,t)s+ kn,tµ} dt
]
;
here, the expectation is both about the process of allocations kn,t and the unknown ex-
pected per-period payoff µ, a random variable with possible values µ0, . . . , µL. With s
lying in the interior of the range of possible realizations of µ, each player has an incentive
to learn the quality of the risky arm.
Players do not discount future payoffs, and are instead assumed to use the strong
long-run average criterion.7 This means that player n chooses allocations kn,t so as to
maximize
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
(1− kn,t)s+ kn,tm(π)− f(π)
}
dt
]
.
Here, the integrand is the difference between what a player expects to receive at a given
point in time and what she would expect to receive were she to be fully informed. Note
that this objective function depends on others’ actions only through their impact on the
player’s own choices. In fact, we will soon impose restrictions under which others’ actions
matter only through their effect on a player’s beliefs.
The players start with a common prior belief π0 about the unknown state ℓ, given by
the probabilities with which nature draws this state, namely π. Thereafter, all observe
each other’s actions and outcomes as well as a common background signal, so they hold
common posterior beliefs throughout time. The background signal is generated by the
time-changed process X0τ0(t) where X
0 is an independent process of the same law as each
player’s payoff process from the risky arm, and τ 0(t) = k0t with k0 > 0 exogenously given
and arbitrarily small. This signal ensures that the players eventually learn the value of µ
even if they all play safe all the time.
Let πt denote the players’ common Bayesian posterior belief about the state given their
observations up to time t. With respect to the information filtration generated by these
observations, the process of beliefs πt is a Markov process (in fact, a jump diffusion) and
a martingale. The linearity of the functions m and f now implies that E[m(πt)] = m(π)
and E[f(πt)] = f(π) for all t ≥ 0, so we can rewrite the above objective function as
E
[∫ ∞
0
{
(1− kn,t)s+ kn,tm(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt
]
,
7 For a discussion of this criterion and the role of the background signal introduced in the next
paragraph, see Bolton and Harris (2000).
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highlighting the potential for the posterior belief to serve as a state variable.
From now on, we restrict players to strategies that are Markovian with respect to this
variable, so that the action kn,t chosen at time t is a deterministic function of the posterior
πt only. More precisely, we take the players’ common strategy space K to be the set of
all Lipschitz continuous functions from the L-dimensional simplex
∆L =
{
π ∈ RL+ :
L∑
ℓ=1
πℓ ≤ 1
}
to [0, 1]. By standard existence and uniqueness results for solutions of stochastic differen-
tial equations, any strategy profile (κ1, . . . , κN) ∈ K
N gives rise to a well-defined process
of posterior beliefs,8 and hence to well-defined payoffs
un(π|κ1, . . . , κN) = E
[∫ ∞
0
{
[1− κn(πt)]s+ κn(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt
∣∣∣∣ π0 = π
]
∈ [−∞, 0].
A player’s payoff will indeed be −∞ for certain Markov strategies. If the player always
uses the safe arm, for example, and the true state ℓ is such that µℓ > s, then by almost
sure convergence of posterior beliefs to the truth, the above integrand will converge to
s− µℓ < 0 as t grows large, implying a diverging integral in that state. Since this occurs
with positive prior probability, the expected payoff is −∞, therefore.
We call a strategy in κn ∈ K reasonable if each degenerate belief has a neighbourhood
in which the strategy prescribes the action that is optimal in the respective state; in
particular, [1 − κn(π)]s + κn(π)m(π) = max{s,m(π)} in all these neighbourhoods, and
[1− κn(π)]s+ κn(π)m(π)− f(π) = 0 in all vertices of the simplex ∆L. Establishing that
posterior beliefs converge exponentially fast to the truth, we show in the appendix that
the expected payoff from a reasonable strategy is always finite and, in fact, bounded on
the simplex.
Strategy κn ∈ K is a best response against κ¬n = (κ1, . . . , κn−1, κn+1, . . . , κN) ∈ K
N−1
if un(π|κn, κ¬n) ≥ un(π|κ˜n, κ¬n) for all π ∈ ∆
L and all κ˜n ∈ K. A Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE) is a profile of strategies (κ1, . . . , κN) ∈ K
N that are mutually best
responses. Such an equilibrium is symmetric if κ1 = κ2 = . . . = κN . Obviously, each
8 For L = 1 and no discontinuous payoff component, i.e. in the setting analyzed in Bolton and
Harris (2000), the presence of background information allows one to invoke a result of Engelbert and
Schmidt (1984) whereby any profile of Borel measurable Markov strategies implies a unique solution for
the belief dynamics; see also Section 5.5 of Karatzas and Shreve (1988). For L = 1, no Brownian payoff
component, and lump-sum payoffs that are always good news (meaning that ν0(B) ≤ ν1(B) for all Borel
sets B ⊆ R\{0}), one can proceed as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010)
and take K to be the set of functions which are left-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous; as
beliefs drift down deterministically in between lump-sums, these properties allow one to construct belief
dynamics in a pathwise fashion. Neither approach generalizes to higher dimensions.
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player must obtain a finite payoff in any MPE.
3 The Infinitesimal Generator
The evolution of posterior beliefs is driven by up to N +1 distinct sources of information:
the observations on up to N risky arms plus the background signal. Suppose that only
player 1 uses the risky arm, and at full intensity. In other words, consider the time-
invariant action profile for which k1 = 1 whereas kn = 0 for all n > 1. Write G for
the infinitesimal generator of the corresponding belief process – as the payoff-generating
process is the same on every player’s risky arm, the identity of the player in question does
indeed not matter here.
If we now change player 1’s time-invariant intensity to k1 < 1 while keeping all other
intensities at zero, the resulting deceleration of the process of observations implies the
scaled-down generator k1G for the posterior belief; see Dynkin (1965), for example. The
same applies to the background signal, of course, if it alone is observed, with associated
generator k0G.
As the processes X0 and X1 are independent conditionally on the realized state,
Trotter (1959) implies that the infinitesimal generator of posterior beliefs is (k0 + k1)G
when both the background signal and player 1’s payoffs are observed. By the same token,
successively adding the other players with time-invariant allocations k2, . . . , kN leads to
the infinitesimal generator (k0 + K)G where K =
∑N
n=1 kn measures how much of the
N available units of the resource is allocated to risky arms overall. This fact will play a
crucial role in our analysis.
The generator G is that of a jump diffusion. In the interior
◦
∆L of the simplex, its
action on a C2 function u is given by
Gu(π) =
1
2σ2
L∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
πi πℓ [ρi − ρ(π)][ρℓ − ρ(π)]
∂2u(π)
∂πi ∂πℓ
+
∫
R\{0}
[u(j(π, h))− u(π)] ν(π)(dh) −
L∑
ℓ=1
πℓ (λℓ − λ(π))
∂u(π)
∂πℓ
,
where
ρ(π) =
L∑
ℓ=0
πℓ ρℓ, ν(π) =
L∑
ℓ=0
πℓ νℓ, λ(π) =
L∑
ℓ=0
πℓ λℓ,
and
jℓ(π, h) =
πℓ νℓ(dh)
ν(π)(dh)
is the revised probability of state ℓ after a lump-sum payoff of size h arrives. The first
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term captures the learning from the continuous part of the payoff-generating process; the
second term, the discrete belief revision upon the arrival of a lump-sum payoff; and the
third term, the gradual belief revision when no such lump-sum arrives.
For L = 1, and hence π = π1, we obtain the generator computed by Cohen and Solan
(2013), with the first term simplifying to
1
2σ2
(ρ1 − ρ0)
2π2(1− π)2 u′′(π),
the expression familiar from Bolton and Harris (1999, 2000). It reflects the fact, estab-
lished in Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 9.1), that when there is no discontinuous
payoff component (λ0 = λ1 = 0), then the posterior belief πt of a single agent who allo-
cates his entire resource to the risky arm follows a diffusion process with zero drift and
diffusion coefficient (ρ1 − ρ0) σ
−1πt(1− πt) relative to the agent’s information filtration.
9
For L > 1, a generalization of Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 9.1) shows that, from
the agent’s perspective, the corresponding belief process πt is a driftless L-dimensional
diffusion with instantaneous variance-covariance matrix given by
Cov [dπi,t, dπℓ,t | πt] =
[
πi,t (ρi − ρ(πt)) σ
−1
] [
πℓ,t (ρℓ − ρ(πt)) σ
−1
]
dt,
hence the structure of the first term in Gu.10
The second and third terms generalize their counterparts in Cohen and Solan (2013) to
L > 1 in the obvious way. In the special case that L = 1 and the size of lump-sum payoffs
is uninformative (meaning that conditional on the arrival of a lump-sum, the distribution
of its size does not depend on ℓ), these terms reduce to
λ(π)
[
u
(
πλ1
(1− π)λ0 + πλ1
)
− u(π)
]
− (λ1 − λ0)π(1− π)u
′(π),
as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010).
Note that we have not imposed any mutual absolute continuity assumptions on the
measures ν0, . . . , νL. As a consequence, lump-sum payoffs of a certain size may rule out
certain states, so that the posterior belief jumps to a subsimplex of ∆L of dimension
lower than L. Once this happens, Bayesian updating ensures that beliefs remain in this
subsimplex.
9 More precisely, the belief evolves according to dπt = σ
−1 πt[ρ1 − ρ(πt)] dZ¯t where the innovation
process Z¯t, given by dZ¯t = σ
−1
(
[ρ− ρ(πt)] dt+ σ dZt
)
, is a Wiener process relative to the agent’s infor-
mation filtration.
10 This generalization already appears in Veronesi (2000), for example.
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4 Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Suppose that all players except player n use the strategy κ† ∈ K, and write (κn, κ
†
¬n) for
the strategy profile that results when player n uses the strategy κn ∈ K.
When choosing κn, player n faces a problem of optimal stochastic control of a jump
diffusion, and κn is a best response if and only if the payoff function un(·|κn, κ
†
¬n) is
the value function for that control problem. This means in particular that a necessary
condition for κn to be a best response is that the payoff function un(·|κn, κ
†
¬n) be a viscosity
solution of the HJB equation
0 = max
k∈[0,1]
{
(1− k)s+ km(π)− f(π) + [k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π) + k]Gu(π)
}
(1)
in the interior
◦
∆L of the L-dimensional simplex; see Øksendal and Sulem (2007) or Pham
(2009), for example.11 Conversely, the following conditions are sufficient for κn to be a best
response: (i) un(·|κn, κ
†
¬n) is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation in
◦
∆L and satisfies
the appropriate boundary condition on ∂∆L; (ii) there exists only one such solution.
As the left-hand side of (1) is zero (a consequence of no discounting) and k0 + (N −
1)κ†(π) + k is positive (because of the background signal), the HJB equation can be
rearranged as
0 = max
k∈[0,1]
s− f(π) + k[m(π)− s]
k0 + (N − 1)κ†(π) + k
+ Gu(π),
which demonstrates that the set of maximizers does not depend on continuation values.
Straightforward algebra allows us to further simplify the problem by rewriting the HJB
equation so that k appears only in the denominator:
0 = max
k∈[0,1]
[k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π)][s−m(π)]− [f(π)− s]
k0 + (N − 1)κ†(π) + k
− [s−m(π)] + Gu(π). (2)
Following Bolton and Harris (2000), we define the incentive to experiment by
I(π) =
f(π)− s
s−m(π)
when m(π) < s, and ∞ otherwise. When I(π) < k0+ (N − 1)κ
†(π), the numerator in (2)
is positive and the maximum is achieved by k = 0; when I(π) > k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π), the
numerator is negative and the maximum is achieved by k = 1; when I(π) = k0 + (N −
1)κ†(π), the numerator is zero and the choice of k is inconsequential.
There are three different ways, therefore, in which k = κ†(π) can achieve the maximum
11 A definition of viscosity solutions is given in the appendix.
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in the HJB equation: either κ†(π) = 0 and I(π) ≤ k0, or κ
†(π) = 1 and I(π) ≥ k0+N−1,
or 0 < κ†(π) < 1 and I(π) = k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π). This pins down κ†(π) in terms of the
incentive to experiment, I(π), the strength of the background signal, k0, and the number
of players, N :
κ†(π) =


0 if I(π) ≤ k0,
I(π)−k0
N−1
if k0 < I(π) < k0 +N − 1,
1 if I(π) ≥ k0 +N − 1.
(3)
As the partial derivatives of the incentive to experiment I are clearly bounded on the com-
pact set {π ∈ ∆L : k0 ≤ I(π) ≤ k0 +N − 1}, the function κ
† is Lipschitz continuous and
hence an element of K. Like the functionsm and f , moreover, I and κ† are non-decreasing
in π. Finally, it is straightforward to check that κ† prescribes the full-information optimal
action in a neighbourhood of each vertex of ∆L, so the strategy is reasonable.
Proposition. All players using the strategy κ† constitutes the unique symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium of the experimentation game.
Proof: That this strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium is shown in the appendix.
Uniqueness follows from the arguments that led us from the HJB equation (1) to the
representation (3) for candidate equilibrium actions.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the case L = 2. (In both figures, µ0 = 2, µ1 = 5, µ2 = 8,
N = 4 and k0 = 0.2; s = 6 in Figure 1, and s = 4 in Figure 2.) The solid lines are the
boundaries of the sets of beliefs at which the equilibrium requires full experimentation
(κ† = 1) and no experimentation (κ† = 0), respectively. The dotted lines are level curves
of κ† for the experimentation intensities 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. A comparison of the two
figures exhibits the familiar property that a decrease in the reward from the safe arm
gives the players an increased incentive to experiment.
Note that by equation (3), the set of beliefs for which κ†(π) = 0 is independent of the
number of players and actually the same as for a single agent experimenting in isolation.
This is a stark manifestation of the incentive to free-ride on information generated by
others. In the terminology coined by Bolton and Harris (1999), it means that there is
no ‘encouragement effect’: the prospect of subsequent experimentation by other players
provides a player no incentive to increase the current intensity of experimentation and
thereby shorten the time at which the information generated by the other players arrives.
Intuitively, this simply reflects our assumption that players do not discount future payoffs
and hence are indifferent as to their timing. Formally, the absence of the encouragement
effect is a consequence of the linearity of the infinitesimal generator of posterior beliefs in
k0 +K: as the value of future experimentation by other players is captured by a player’s
equilibrium continuation values, yet best responses are independent of those continuation
values, there is no channel for future experimentation by others to impact current actions.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium actions for L = 2
and µ0 < µ1 < s < µ2
0 1
2
. ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
κ†=0
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
κ†=1
Figure 2: Equilibrium actions for L = 2
and µ0 < s < µ1 < µ2
Free-riding can also be seen in the fact that κ† is non-increasing in N , and decreasing
where it assumes interior values. Figure 3 illustrates this effect. On the horizontal axis
Belief
κ†
Figure 3: Equilibrium actions for L = 2, π1 = π2 and N ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}
we set π1 = π2 and let that common belief range from 0 to 0.5: so it is a slice through
the simplex from the 0-vertex to the midpoint of the opposite edge. (In this figure, the
parameters are as in Figure 1 except that N varies from 2 for the leftmost curve to 10 for
the rightmost curve.)
The dependence of the overall intensity of experimentation on the number of players is
less clear cut: roughly speaking, Nκ† increases in N at beliefs where κ† requires exclusive
use of the risky arm, but decreases at beliefs where both arms are used simultaneously.
11
As to the dynamics of beliefs in equilibrium, the present framework permits the anal-
ysis of experimentation games in which large payoff increments are bad news.12 For
example, let L = 1 for simplicity, with ρ0 = ρ1 and λ0 = λ1. Assume that the payoff
increments are in the set {s− 10, s− 5, s+ 5, s+ 10}. For the ‘good’ arm, the associated
probabilities of a lump-sum of that size are {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1}, so the expected increment
is s + 1; for the ‘bad’ arm, the associated probabilities of a lump-sum of that size are
{0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3}, and the expected increment is s− 2. When a payoff increment occurs,
the belief jumps – up if the increment is moderate (s − 5 and s + 5 are relatively more
likely if the arm is ‘good’), and down if the increment is extreme (s− 10 and s + 10 are
relatively more likely if the arm is ‘bad’). So, in this stripped-down illustration, an arrival
of the largest possible payoff increment is bad news, and may well cause the players to
stop experimenting.
Finally, by the martingale convergence theorem, beliefs converge almost surely to the
degenerate distribution concentrated on the true value of µ; therefore f(π) converges to
either s or the true µ, and so κ†(π) converges to either 0 or 1. As was already said in
Section 2, we show in the appendix that the convergence of beliefs is exponentially fast
in expectation; this immediately implies that equilibrium actions converge exponentially
fast as well.
5 Continuous State Spaces and Sufficient Statistics
This section presents two specifications of priors and payoff-generating processes that fall
outside the framework of Section 2 but still permit the same analysis as in Sections 3 and 4.
In both settings, the unknown state of the world is drawn from a continuous distribution
of unbounded support, with conjugate priors ensuring that the players’ information is
captured by a two-dimensional sufficient statistic, which can serve as the state variable for
Markov strategies.13 Models in which agents have beliefs and observe stochastic processes
like those in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 can be found in Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini and
Squintani (2010), respectively.
12 In Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010, 2015) lump-sum sizes are completely
uninformative, while in Cohen and Solan (2013) lump-sums are informative, but always good news.
13 The unbounded state space requires adjustments to the proof (via uniqueness of viscosity solutions
to the HJB equation) that every player using the strategy κ† constitutes an MPE of the game; we omit
the details here.
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5.1 Brownian Payoffs, Normal Prior
Suppose that the payoff-generating processes and the background signal are of the form
Xnt = µ t+ σZ
n
t ,
where the Zn are independent standard Wiener processes and nature draws the unknown
drift µ from a normal distribution with mean m0 and precision τ0 > 0. This is also the
players’ common prior. Given the Gaussian process they observe, players then believe at
time t that µ is distributed according to a normal distribution with some mean mt and
precision τt > 0; see DeGroot (1970, Chapter 9), for example. The pair πt = (mt, τt)
constitutes a sufficient statistic for the updating of beliefs, therefore. Given a generic
π = (m, τ) ∈ R× ]0,∞[ , the corresponding probability density function for µ is g(µ; π) =
τ 1/2φ
(
(µ−m)τ 1/2
)
, where φ denotes the standard normal density. Let G(·; π) denote the
associated cumulative distribution function.
As in Section 3, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm.
Following Chernoff (1968, Lemma 4.1) or Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 10.1),
τt increases deterministically at the rate σ
−2 and mt is a driftless diffusion process with
diffusion coefficient σ−1 τ−1t relative to the player’s information filtration.
14 As a result,
we see that
Gu(π) =
1
σ2
[
1
2τ 2
∂2u(π)
∂m2
+
∂u(π)
∂τ
]
for any function of class C2,1. By the same arguments as in Section 3, moreover, the
generator associated with time-invariant intensities (k0, k1, . . . , kN) ∈ [0, 1]
N+1 is again
(k0 +K)G.
Since the precision τt increases over time, the relevant state space is the half-plane
Π = R × [τ0,∞[ . As to admissible strategies, we take K to be the set of all functions
κ : Π → [0, 1] such that κτ−1 is Lipschitz continuous on Π. Given a strategy profile
(κ1, . . . , κN) ∈ K
N , the sum K =
∑N
n=1 κn also lies in K, and the system we need to solve
is
dm = K(m, τ) τ−1σ−1dZ¯, dτ = K(m, τ) σ−2dt.
The change of variable η = ln τ transforms this into dm = K(m, eη) e−ησ−1dZ¯ and dη =
K(m, eη) e−ησ−2dt; as K(m, eη) e−η is Lipschitz continuous in (m, η) on R × [ln τ0,∞[ ,
this system has a unique solution, as was to be shown.
We can now replicate the arguments of Section 4 in the present setting. As a first
step, we compute the expected current payoff m(π), the expected full-information payoff
14 More precisely, it can be shown that dmt = σ
−1 τ−1t dZ¯t and dτt = σ
−2 dt where, now, the innovation
process is dZ¯t = σ
−1
(
[µ−mt] dt+ σ dZt
)
. Note that the expression equivalent to that for dmt to be
found in equation (9) of Jovanovic (1979) omits the term [µ−mt] dt.
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f(π), and the incentive to experiment I(π). The expected current payoff m(π) is simply
the projection of π on its first component. For the expected full-information payoff, we
have
f(π) = sΦ(z) +m [1− Φ(z)] + τ−1/2φ(z),
where z = (s−m)τ 1/2 and Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution func-
tion. To see this, note first that f(π) = sG(s; π) +
∫∞
s
µ g(µ; π) dµ. We trivially obtain
G(s; π) =
∫ s
−∞
g(µ; π) dµ =
∫ z
−∞
φ(x) dx = Φ(z). Since g(µ; π) ∝ exp
(
−1
2
(µ−m)2τ
)
,
moreover, we have dg(µ; π) = −(µ−m)τ g(µ; π) dµ and so µ g(µ; π) dµ = mg(µ; π) dµ−
τ−1 dg(µ; π), implying
∫ ∞
s
µ g(µ; π) dµ =
∫ ∞
s
mg(µ; π) dµ−
∫ ∞
s
τ−1 dG(µ; π)
= m [1−G(s; π)] + τ−1 g(s; π) = m [1− Φ(z)] + τ−1/2 φ(z).
The above representation makes it straightforward to verify that f is strictly increasing
in m and strictly decreasing in τ .15 This implies that I and κ† as defined in (3) are non-
decreasing in m and non-increasing in τ .
When m < s, we have
I(π) =
sΦ(z) +m [1− Φ(z)] + τ−1/2φ(z)− s
s−m
= Φ(z)− 1 + z−1φ(z).
In the appendix, we verify that κ† ∈ K by showing that Iτ−1 is Lipschitz continuous on
the set {π ∈ Π : k0 ≤ I(π) ≤ k0 +N − 1}. This is more involved than in scenarios with a
discrete prior because the set in question is unbounded.
Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium actions as a function of the posterior mean m and
variance τ−1. (In this figure, s = 6 and N = 4.) As in Figures 1–2, the solid curves are
the boundaries of the sets of beliefs at which the equilibrium requires full experiment-
ation or no experimentation, and the dashed lines are level curves for κ† equal to 0.2,
0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. All these curves are downward sloping; as one would expect, there is
a trade-off between mean and variance with the latter capturing the ‘option value’ of
experimentation. In particular, a very high variance is needed to induce a high intensity
of experimentation at low means. As the mean approaches the safe flow payoff, the level
curves become steeper and steeper so that the posterior variance has a diminishing impact
on the intensity with which the players explore the risky arm.
15 Alternatively, since max{s, µ} is increasing in µ, a first-order stochastic dominance argument can
be used to establish that ∂f(π)/∂m > 0, and since max{s, µ} is convex in µ, a second-order stochastic
dominance argument can be used to establish that ∂f(π)/∂τ < 0.
14
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Figure 4: Equilibrium actions for Brownian payoffs and normal prior
5.2 Poisson Payoffs, Gamma Prior
Let s > 0 for the safe arm. Suppose that the payoff-generating processes and the back-
ground signal are independent Poisson processes whose unknown common intensity µ is
drawn from a gamma distribution with parameters α0 > 0 and β0 > 0. This is also the
players’ common prior. Given the processes they observe, players then believe at time
t that µ is distributed according to a gamma distribution with some parameters αt > 0
and βt > 0, which together constitute a sufficient statistic again; see DeGroot (1970,
Chapter 9), for example. Given a generic π = (α, β) ∈ ]0,∞[2, the probability density
function for µ is g(µ; π) = [βα/Γ(α)]µα−1e−βµ; the mean and variance of µ are α/β and
α/β2, respectively. We again write G(·; π) for the corresponding cumulative distribution
function.
Once more, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm. He
expects to obtain a positive increment between t and t + dt with probability (αt/βt) dt,
in which case Bayes’ rule implies that πt jumps to (αt + 1, βt); with probability 1 −
(αt/βt) dt, there is no such increment and dπt = (dαt, dβt) = (0, dt). Thus, α counts
arrivals of increments and β measures the time that has elapsed – again, see DeGroot
(1970, Chapter 9). As a consequence, we have
Gu(π) =
α
β
[u(α+ 1, β)− u(π)] +
∂u(π)
∂β
.
Once more, the generator associated with time-invariant intensities (k0, k1, . . . , kN) ∈
[0, 1]N+1 is (k0 +K)G.
Given that αt and βt increase over time, and αt can only do so in unit increments, the
relevant state space is Π = {α0+ j : j = 0, 1, 2, . . .}× [β0,∞[ . For K, we choose the set of
15
all functions κ : Π→ [0, 1] such that κ(α0+j, ·) is right-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz
continuous for all j. Starting from any π ∈ Π, any strategy profile (κ1, . . . , κN) ∈ K
N
induces a well-defined and unique law of motion for πt,
As the unknown intensity µ is also the risky arm’s average payoff per unit of time, we
see that the expected current payoff is m(π) = α/β. The expected full-information payoff
is
f(π) = sG(s; π) +
α
β
[1−G(s;α + 1, β)],
with the second term obtained as follows:∫ ∞
s
µ g(µ; π) dµ =
∫ ∞
s
µ
βα
Γ(α)
µα−1e−βµ dµ =
α
β
∫ ∞
s
βα+1
αΓ(α)
µαe−βµ dµ
=
α
β
∫ ∞
s
βα+1
Γ(α + 1)
µαe−βµ dµ =
α
β
∫ ∞
s
g(µ;α+ 1, β) dµ
=
α
β
[1−G(s;α+ 1, β)].
The formula for f makes it straightforward to verify that, exactly like m, this function
is strictly increasing in α and strictly decreasing in β.16 Consequently, the incentive to
experiment I and the strategy κ† as defined in (3) are non-decreasing in α and non-
increasing in β.
For m(π) < s, we have
I(π) =
sG(s;α, β) + α
β
[1−G(s;α+ 1, β)]− s
s− α
β
=
sG(s;α, β)− α
β
G(s;α+ 1, β)
s− α
β
− 1.
In the appendix, we verify that κ† ∈ K by showing for any fixed α that I(α, ·) has a
bounded first derivative when m(π) < s.
Figure 5 illustrates the mean-variance trade-off in equilibrium actions for Poisson
payoffs and gamma prior. (Here, as in the example with Brownian payoffs and normal
prior, s = 6 and N = 4; the curves shown are thus the exact counterparts of those in
Figure 4.) To compute the level curves, one uses the fact that the shape parameter α
equals the squared mean of the gamma distribution divided by its variance, and β is α
divided by the mean. The similarity to Figure 4 is striking; a closer comparison reveals
that the level curves in the Brownian-normal case are somewhat steeper than those in the
Poisson-gamma case. This is because in the former, an increase in the variance induces
a mean-preserving spread for the random variable α on the whole real axis, whereas in
16 Alternatively, for α′ > α′′ the likelihood ratio g(α;α′, β)/g(α;α′′, β) is increasing, and for β′ > β′′ the
likelihood ratio g(α;α, β′)/g(α;α, β′′) is decreasing. Since the likelihood-ratio ordering implies first-order
stochastic dominance, f has the stated monotonicity properties.
16
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Figure 5: Equilibrium actions for Poisson payoffs and gamma prior
the latter, the mean-preserving spread is concentrated on the positive half-axis and thus
raises the option value of experimentation by more.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have seen that when rewards from the risky arm are generated by IID Le´vy processes
with an unknown average payoff per unit of time, the players’ strategy in a symmetric
MPE of the undiscounted experimentation game depends only – and in a very simple
functional form – on the safe payoff, the expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the
expected full-information payoff. Given a finite set from which nature draws the unknown
average payoff, the equilibrium strategy is then independent of the actual specification of
the payoff-generating processes.
As to the settings with a continuous prior, recall that in the Brownian-normal case
the precision of the posterior distribution increases unboundedly with time, as does the
inverse of the variance in the Poisson-gamma case. Consequently, the posterior proba-
bility density function becomes concentrated on a narrow domain of the support. If we
approximated the normal or gamma distribution with a discrete distribution then, over
time, the beliefs would become more and more concentrated on the discrete values closest
to the true parameter – this suggests that we could take the ‘engineering’ approach and
focus on discrete distributions, with the specification of the payoff-generating processes
being irrelevant.17
17 But note that if the two closest neighbours of the true average payoff µ per unit of time are µℓ and µℓ+1
with µℓ < µ < µℓ+1, then, althoughm(πT ) ≃ µ for large T , we would have Var[µ|πT ] ≃ (µℓ+1−µ)(µ−µℓ),
which is bounded away from zero.
17
Letting the discount rate go to zero is going to make the analysis easier in many
dynamic settings, but it remains unclear, in general, whether the simplification will be as
great as in the present case. Candidates for optimal strategies or best responses may be
easier to identify in the undiscounted limit, but there remains the need to obtain a well-
defined law of motion, which may again require restrictions such as Lipschitz continuity
and could even lead to existence problems. Nevertheless, we believe that the strong long-
run average criterion has the potential to prove useful in other contexts, especially since
strategies which are optimal under this criterion will shed light on (at least approximately)
optimal behaviour for small positive discount rates.
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Appendix
Boundedness of Payoffs from Reasonable Strategies
We present the case L = 1 only, so that ℓ ∈ {0, 1}, π = π1 ∈ [0, 1], µ0 < s < µ1, m(π) =
(1− π)µ0+πµ1 and f(π) = (1− π)s+ πµ1. Suppose first that the Le´vy measures ν0 and ν1 are
non-trivial and equivalent.
For the description of the evolution of beliefs, it is convenient to work with the log odds ratio
ωt = ln
πt
1− πt
,
so that
πt =
eωt
1 + eωt
and 1− πt =
e−ωt
1 + e−ωt
.
Lemma A.1 There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ R,
ex+y
1 + ex+y
≤
ex
1 + ex
+
ex
(1 + ex)2
y + C
ex
(1 + ex)3
y2.
Proof: For
f(x, y) =
ex+y
1 + ex+y
,
we compute the partial derivatives
fy(x, y) =
ex+y
(1 + ex+y)2
, fyy(x, y) =
ex+y(1− ex+y)
(1 + ex+y)3
.
For fixed x, the function f(x, ·) thus has the following second-order Taylor approximation around
y0 = 0:
f(x, y) ≈
ex
1 + ex
+
ex
(1 + ex)2
y +
1
2
ex(1− ex)
(1 + ex)3
y2.
As 1− ex ≤ 1, we have the local (with respect to the second variable) upper bound
f(x, y) ≤
ex
1 + ex
+
ex
(1 + ex)2
y +
1
2
ex
(1 + ex)3
y2.
Replacing the factor 12 in the last term by a sufficiently large constant C ensures a global upper
bound.18
Suppose now that starting from π0 = π (and corresponding ω0 = ω), the players use the
strategy profile (κ1, . . . , κN ) ∈ K
N . By an extension of the results in Cohen and Solan (2013,
Section 3.2) to more than one agent, the log odds ratio at time t > 0 can be written as
ωt = ω + ηℓ
[
k0t+
N∑
n=1
∫ t
0
κn(πs−) ds
]
+M ℓt ,
18 Numerical computations suggest that C = 2 is large enough.
19
where
ηℓ = (−1)
ℓ+1 (ρ1 − ρ0)
2
2σ2
− (λ1 − λ0) +
∫
R\{0}
ln
ν1
ν0
(h) νℓ(dh),
ν1
ν0
is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ν1 with respect to ν0, and M
ℓ is a martingale under the
probability measure Pℓ associated with state ℓ. The expectation and variance of M
ℓ under this
measure, moreover, satisfy Eℓ[M
ℓ
t ] = 0 and Varℓ[M
ℓ
t ] ≤ Cℓ t for all t and a positive constant
Cℓ.
19
As lnx < x− 1 for all positive x 6= 1, and ν1ν0 = (
ν0
ν1
)−1, one sees that
∫
R\{0}
ln
ν1
ν0
(h) ν0(dh) < λ1 − λ0 <
∫
R\{0}
ln
ν1
ν0
(h) ν1(dh)
unless ν1 = ν0, in which case the inequality µ1 > µ0 implies ρ1 > ρ0. So η0 < 0 < η1. As κn ≥ 0
for all n, this in turn implies
ω + η0k0t+M
0
t ≥ ωt ≥ ω + η1k0t+M
1
t .
By Lemma A.1,
πt ≤
eω+η0k0t+M
0
t
1 + eω+η0k0t+M
0
t
≤
eω+η0k0t
1 + eω+η0k0t
+
eω+η0k0t
(1 + eω+η0k0t)2
M0t + C
eω+η0k0t
(1 + eω+η0k0t)3
(M0t )
2
and
1− πt ≤
e−ω−η1k0t−M
1
t
1 + e−ω−η1k0t−M
1
t
≤
e−ω−η1k0t
1 + e−ω−η1k0t
−
e−ω−η1k0t
(1 + e−ω−η1k0t)2
M1t +C
e−ω−η1k0t
(1 + e−ω−η1k0t)3
(M1t )
2.
Writing C ′ℓ = CCℓ, we thus have
E0[πt] ≤ e
ω+η0k0t
(
1 + CVar0[M
0
t ]
)
= eω+η0k0t(1 + C ′0t) =
π
1− π
eη0k0t(1 + C ′0t)
and
E1[1− πt] ≤ e
−ω−η1k0t
(
1 + CVar1[M
1
t ]
)
= e−ω−η1k0t(1 + C ′1t) =
1− π
π
e−η1k0t(1 + C ′1t).
Now let player n use a reasonable strategy. Then there is a constant C2 > 0 such that
[1− κn(π)]s + κn(π)m(π)− f(π) ≥ C2 [max{s,m(π)} − f(π)]
for all π. Note that max{s,m(π)} − f(π) is bounded below by s − f(π) = π (s − µ1) and by
m(π)− f(π) = (1− π) (µ0 − s).
Given the prior belief π0 = π, the player uses the expectation operator Eπ = (1−π)E0+πE1
to compute her objective function. Thus,
19 For any fixed action profile, M ℓ has stationary increments, so its variance grows linearly with time.
Cℓ can be chosen as the rate at which the variance grows when all players use the risky arm exclusively.
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un(π|κ1, . . . , κN )
≥ (1− π)C2(s− µ1)E0
[∫ ∞
0
πt dt
]
+ πC2(µ0 − s)E1
[∫ ∞
0
(1− πt) dt
]
= (1− π)C2(s− µ1)
∫ ∞
0
E0[πt] dt+ πC2(µ0 − s)
∫ ∞
0
E1[1− πt] dt
≥ πC2(s− µ1)
∫ ∞
0
eη0k0t(1 + C ′0t) dt+ (1− π)C2(µ0 − s)
∫ ∞
0
e−η1k0t(1 + C ′1t) dt
= πC2(s− µ1)
C ′0 − η0k0
η20k
2
0
+ (1− π)C2(µ0 − s)
C ′1 + η1k0
η21k
2
0
.
This is the desired result.
Next, suppose that the Le´vy measure ν1, say, is not absolutely continuous with respect to
ν0. Take a ν0-null set B ⊆ R\{0} with ν1(B) > 0. In state ℓ = 1, we then have P1[πt = 1] ≥
1− e−ν1(B)t, so that
E1[1− πt] = P1[πt = 1] · 0 + P1[πt < 1] · E1[1− πt|πt < 1] ≤ P1[πt < 1] ≤ e
−ν1(B)t.
This exponential convergence again allows us to compute an upper bound for
∫∞
0 E1[1− πt] dt.
Finally, if both Le´vy measures are trivial, the inequality η0 < 0 < η1 holds trivially, and the
result follows as above.
Viscosity Solutions of the HJB Equation
Consider a nonempty, open, connected and bounded set Ω ⊂ RL. Denote the set of all symmetric
L× L matrices by SL. Let H ∈ C(Ω× RL × SL × R) satisfy
H(x, p,X + Y, d) ≥ H(x, p,X, d + q)
for all (x, p,X, d) ∈ Ω× RL × SL × R, all positive semidefinite Y ∈ SN and all q ≥ 0.20
We are interested in solutions u : Ω→ R of boundary value problems of the form
H(x,Du,D2u, u−Mu) = 0 in Ω, (A.1)
u = v on ∂Ω, (A.2)
where Du and D2u are the gradient and the Hessian matrix of u, respectively, M is an operator
mapping C(Ω) into itself, and v ∈ C(Ω).
A function u ∈ C(Ω) is called a viscosity subsolution of (A.1) if for every φ ∈ C2(Ω) and
every x0 ∈ Ω such that φ ≥ u on Ω and φ(x0) = u(x0),
H(x0,Dφ(x0),D
2φ(x0), φ(x0)−Mφ(x0)) ≥ 0.
Analogously, a function u ∈ C(Ω) is called a viscosity supersolution of (A.1) if for every φ ∈
20 Note that the variables X and Y just introduced are unrelated to the objects for which we use these
symbols in the main text.
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C2(Ω) and every x0 ∈ Ω such that φ ≤ u on Ω and φ(x0) = u(x0),
H(x0,Dφ(x0),D
2φ(x0), φ(x0)−Mφ(x0)) ≤ 0.
Finally, u ∈ C(Ω) is called a viscosity solution of (A.1) if it is a viscosity sub- and supersolution
of (A.1).
The HJB equation (1) and its reformulation (2) are both of the form (A.1) with Ω =
◦
∆L,
the operator in question being
Mu(π) =
1
λ(π)
∫
R\{0}
u(j(π, h)) ν(π)(dh).
By the arguments that led us from (1) to (2) in Section 4, these equations have the same viscosity
solutions. We will refer to either equation as the HJB equation in what follows.
Suppose that all players except player n use the strategy κ† defined in (3). Let u∗(·|κ†¬n)
denote the value function of the control problem that player n faces when choosing a best
response, and u(·|κ†, κ†¬n) the player’s payoff function when she also uses strategy κ†, that is,
u(π|κ†, κ†¬n) = E
(κ†,κ†¬n)
[∫ ∞
0
{
[1− κ†(πt)]s + κ
†(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt
∣∣∣∣ π0 = π
]
.
By definition, u∗(·|κ†¬n) ≥ u(·|κ†, κ
†
¬n). We shall establish the converse inequality via a compar-
ison result for viscosity sub- and supersolutions.
We know that both functions are bounded. Assume for now that they are actually continuous
on ∆L; we will justify this assumption later.
Lemma A.2 The value function u∗(·|κ†¬n) is a viscosity subsolution of the HJB equation.
Proof: We simplify the notation by writing u instead of u∗(·|κ†¬n).
Consider φ ∈ C2(∆L) and π0 ∈
◦
∆L such that u− φ ≤ 0 = u(π0)− φ(π0). To establish that
u is a viscosity subsolution of (1), we must show that
max
k∈[0,1]
{
(1− k)s + km(π0)− f(π0) + [k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π0) + k]Gφ(π0)
}
≥ 0.
Suppose that this is not the case, so that
(1− k)s+ km(π0)− f(π0) + [k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π0) + k]Gφ(π0) < 0
for all k ∈ [0, 1]. For ε > 0, define ψ ∈ C2(∆L) by
ψ(π) = φ(π) + ε‖π − π0‖
4
and note that ψ → φ uniformly as ε→ 0. For δ > 0, let Bδ(π0) ⊂ R
L be the open ball of radius
δ centered at π0. By continuity, we can find ε, δ > 0 such that Bδ(π0) ⊂
◦
∆L and
(1− k)s+ km(π)− f(π) + [k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π) + k]Gψ(π) < 0
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for all k ∈ [0, 1] and all π ∈ Bδ(π0). As π0 is a strict maximizer of u− ψ, moreover, there exists
γ > 0 such that u(π) − ψ(π) ≤ −γ for π ∈ ∆L \ Bδ(π0). Suppose now that player n uses the
strategy κ ∈ K against the other players’ common strategy κ†. Define τ = inf{t > 0: ‖πt−π0‖ >
δ}. As k0 > 0, we have E
(κ,κ†¬n)[τ ] <∞ and
E
(κ,κ†¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ(πt)]s+ κ(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt+ u(πτ )
]
− u(π0)
≤ E(κ,κ
†
¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ(πt)]s+ κ(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt+ ψ(πτ )
]
− ψ(π0)− γ
= E(κ,κ
†
¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ(πt)]s + κ(πt)m(πt)− f(πt) + [k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π) + κ(πt)]Gψ(πt)
}
dt
]
− γ
< −γ,
where the equality in the third line follows from Dynkin’s formula. But this contradicts the
dynamic programming principle, which states that
u(π0) = sup
κ∈K
E
(κ,κ†¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ(πt)]s+ κ(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt+ u(πτ )
]
.
Lemma A.3 The payoff function u(·|κ†, κ†¬n) is a viscosity supersolution of the HJB equation.
Proof: We simplify the notation by writing u instead of u(·|κ†, κ†¬n).
Consider φ ∈ C2(∆L) and π0 ∈
◦
∆L such that u−φ ≥ 0 = u(π0)−φ(π0). For any deterministic
time τ > 0,
0 = E(κ
†,κ†¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ†(πt)]s+ κ
†(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt+ u(πτ )
]
− u(π0)
≥ E(κ
†,κ†¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ†(πt)]s+ κ
†(πt)m(πt)− f(πt)
}
dt+ φ(πτ )
]
− φ(π0)
= E(κ
†,κ†¬n)
[∫ τ
0
{
[1− κ†(πt)]s+ κ
†(πt)m(πt)− f(πt) + [k0 +Nκ
†(πt)]Gφ(πt)
}
dt
]
by Dynkin’s formula. Dividing through by τ and letting τ → 0, we get
[1− κ†(π0)]s + κ
†(π0)m(π0)− f(π0) + [k0 +Nκ
†(π0)]Gφ(π0) ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to
[k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π0)][s−m(π0)]− [f(π0)− s]
k0 +Nκ†(π0)
− [s−m(π0)] + Gφ(π0) ≤ 0.
As
κ†(π0) ∈ arg max
k∈[0,1]
[k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(π0)][s −m(π0)]− [f(π0)− s]
k0 + (N − 1)κ†(π0) + k
,
u is thus a viscosity supersolution of (2).
The comparison result that yields the inequality u∗(·|κ†¬n) ≤ u(·|κ†, κ
†
¬n) is due to Ishii and
Yamada (1993). These authors consider functional equations F (x, u,Du,D2u, u−Mu) = 0 such
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that
F (x, r, p,X + Y, d) ≤ F (x, r, p,X, d + q)
for all (x, r, p,X, d) ∈ Ω×R×RL× SL×R, all positive semidefinite Y ∈ SN and all q ≥ 0. This
means that F corresponds to −H here.21 As a consequence, the inequalities defining sub- and
supersolutions in terms of F are the opposite of those in terms of H.
There is a second, more substantive difference between the definitions of Ishii and Yamada
(1993) and ours. Translated back into our setting, a function u ∈ C(Ω) is a viscosity subsolution
of (A.1) in their sense if for every φ ∈ C2(Ω) and every x0 ∈ Ω such that φ − u has a local
minimum in x0,
H(x0,Dφ(x0),D
2φ(x0), u(x0)−Mu(x0)) ≥ 0.
Analogously, a function u ∈ C(Ω) is a viscosity supersolution of (A.1) in their sense if for every
φ ∈ C2(Ω) and every x0 ∈ Ω such that φ− u has a local maximum at x0,
H(x0,Dφ(x0),D
2φ(x0), u(x0)−Mu(x0)) ≤ 0.
In these alternative definitions, therefore, u is replaced by φ only as far as the gradient and
Hessian are concerned, but not in the nonlocal term. When M is an integral operator of the
type considered here, however, an argument in Alvarez and Tourin (1996, p. 300) implies that
these definitions are in fact equivalent to ours.22
Lemma A.4 Let a function v ∈ C(∂∆L) be given. Suppose that u is a viscosity subsolution of
the HJB equation, u a viscosity supersolution, and u ≤ v ≤ u on ∂∆L. Then u ≤ u on ∆L.
Proof: Equation (2) takes the form assumed in Ishii and Yamada (1993) with the domain
Ω =
◦
∆L, the function
F (x, p,X, d) = −
1
2σ2
R(x)′XR(x) + L(x)′p+ λ(x)d− c(x)
where
R(x) =


x1[ρ1 − ρ(x)]
...
xL[ρL − ρ(x)]

 , L(x) =


x1[λ1 − λ(x)]
...
xL[λL − λ(x)]


and
c(x) = max
k∈[0,1]
[k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(x)][s −m(x)]− [f(x)− s]
k0 + (N − 1)κ†(x) + k
− [s −m(x)]
=
[k0 + (N − 1)κ
†(x)][s −m(x)]− [f(x)− s]
k0 +Nκ†(x)
− [s−m(x)],
21 Note that Ishii and Yamada (1993) allow the value of the solution to enter as a separate variable
besides its difference with the nonlocal operator. Because of the absence of discounting, this generality
is not needed here, so H has one argument fewer.
22 See Azimzadeh, Bayraktar and Labahn (2017) for a related discussion.
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and the operator
Mu(x) =
1
λ(x)
∫
R\{0}
u(j(x, h)) ν(x)(dh).
It is straightforward to check that F , M and the function B(x, u) = u−v(x) defined on ∂∆L×R
satisfy all the conditions imposed by Ishii and Yamada (1993). The result thus follows from their
Theorem 3.1.
Corollary A.1 u∗(·|κ†¬n) = u(·|κ†, κ
†
¬n).
Proof: The proof is by induction over the dimension of the faces of the simplex. The 0-faces
(vertices) correspond to degenerate beliefs that assign probability 1 to one of the states; at all
these vertices, both functions assume the value 0. An application of Lemma A.4 for L = 1 now
yields u∗(·|κ†¬n) = u(·|κ†, κ
†
¬n) along any 1-face (edge) of the simplex. Applying the lemma for
L = 2 then proves this identity for all 2-faces (facets), and so on until the entire simplex is
covered.
As a by-product, this confirms that the value function is indeed the unique viscosity solution
of the HJB equation.
It remains to justify our assumption that the functions u∗(·|κ†¬n) and u(·|κ†, κ
†
¬n) are continu-
ous. In fact, using upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous envelopes, Ishii and Yamada
(1993) define the notion of viscosity sub- and supersolution for functions that are merely locally
bounded. Lemmas A.2 and A.3 still hold then, and Lemma A.4 generalizes in a way that ensures
that any viscosity solution satisfying a continuous boundary condition must be continuous over-
all; see Ishii and Yamada (1993, Corollary 3.3). Continuity of the functions in question follows
from an iterative application of this result as in the proof of Corollary A.1.
Verification that κ† ∈ K for Brownian Payoffs and Normal Prior
From the main body of the text, for m < s we have
I(π) = Φ(z)− 1 + z−1φ(z)
where z = (s −m)τ1/2.
The function F (z) = Φ(z) − 1 + z−1φ(z) is a strictly decreasing bijection from ]0,∞[ to
itself with first derivative F ′(z) = −z−2φ(z). For any positive real number c, therefore, we
have I(π) = c if and only if (s − m)τ1/2 = F−1(c). At any such (m, τ) in the half-plane
Π = R × [τ0,∞[ , we have ∂I/∂m = −F
′(F−1(c)) τ1/2 and ∂I/∂τ = 12F
′(F−1(c))F−1(c) τ−1.
To verify that κ† ∈ K, it suffices to show that Iτ−1 is Lipschitz continuous on Π(a, b) =
{π ∈ Π : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b} for any positive real numbers a < b. For I(π) = c, we have ∂(Iτ−1)/∂m =
−F ′(F−1(c)) τ−1/2 and ∂(Iτ−1)/∂τ =
(
1
2F
′(F−1(c))F−1(c)− c
)
τ−2. This establishes that both
partial derivatives of Iτ−1 are bounded along any level curve I(π) = c in Π. Letting c range
from a to b shows that they are bounded on the whole of Π(a, b), so Iτ−1 is indeed Lipschitz
continuous there.
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Verification that κ† ∈ K for Poisson Payoffs and Gamma Prior
Again from the main body of the text, for m(π) = α/β < s we have
I(π) =
sG(s;α, β) − αβ G(s;α + 1, β)
s− αβ
− 1.
We fix α as well as positive real numbers a < b. To verify that κ† ∈ K, it suffices to show that
I(α, ·) is Lipschitz continuous on the set B(a, b) =
{
β ∈ ]αs ,∞[ : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b
}
. To this end, we
note first that
G(s;α, β) −G(s;α + 1, β) =
∫ s
0
βα
Γ(α)
xα−1e−βµ
[
1−
βµ
α
]
dµ.
For β = α/s and µ < s, the term in square brackets under the integral is positive, so we have
G(s;α, αs )−G(s;α+1,
α
s ) > 0. For β ց
α
s , therefore, the numerator sG(s;α, β)−
α
β G(s;α+1, β)
in the above expression for I(π) tends to a positive limit. Given that I(π) is finite for β ∈ B(a, b),
this implies that the denominator in the above expression must be bounded away from 0, i.e. β
must be bounded away from α/s on B(a, b). Using the fact that
∂G(s;α, β)
∂β
=
α
β
[G(s;α, β) −G(s;α + 1, β)] ,
it is now straightforward to verify that I(α, ·) has a bounded first derivative on B(a, b).
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